News, Views and Careers for All of Higher Education
Sept. 14, 2007
The ghost of Ronald Reagan haunts the American university. College campuses are widely supposed to be the bastions of shaggy liberalism, but the good people managing our higher education system have sometimes behaved as if they were possessed by the spirit of Reaganomics rather than the enlightened principles of humanism. Perhaps the most telling evidence of this vexation is their treatment of university presses.
As the gatekeepers of the peer review process in the humanities and many of the social sciences, university presses (along with equivalent journals in the biological and physical sciences) are supposed to ensure that only high-quality scholarship is published — or at least that flawed research never sees the light of day. They are the foundation of the entire scholarly edifice. Yet, over the last three decades, American universities have frequently undermined their presses, displacing their dedication to scholarly values in favor of an incoherent amalgam of free-market ideas about competition and profit. Scholarly publishing in 2007 is a hollow shell of its former self. We now seem to be witnessing a merciful reversal of this trend at the 11th hour; but unless the reversal is made permanent, our system of scholarly communication will remain in terrible peril.
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Those of us who work in books tend to see the early years of scholarly publishing as a kind of intellectual utopia. Universities subsidized not only the research and writing of books, but their publication, marketing, and — through library budgets — their purchase. Indeed, the viability of most university press books was largely assured on the basis of their library sales alone. It was an almost perfectly closed economic circle.
This benign socialist cycle functioned more or less unhindered from the creation of university presses around the turn of the 20th century until it was eroded by the flood of federal education dollars loosed by World War II. The influx of wartime cash accelerated the growth of existing fields and sparked the equally swift development of new ones. The cumulative result was the mega-university, with its sprawling campuses, big-budget research projects, and close ties to government agencies and corporate R&D units. Meanwhile, the G.I. Bill fueled enormous increases in student enrollments.
This convergence of forces taxed the capacity of the higher-education system as a whole, and the publication system in particular: Although presses flourished during the 1950s and ‘60s, the effort required to accommodate such rapid growth was quietly taking its toll. The strain of publishing the system’s vastly-increased output was compounded by a variety of wider social stresses: campus integration; anti-war protests; the emergence of new constituencies and consequent calls for curricular relevance. The 1970s piled on rising oil prices, historic rates of inflation, and growing unemployment. By the mid-1970s, the edifice was collapsing under its own weight. The volume of published output had increased beyond the absorptive capacity of publishers’ scholarly readership; while at the same time the market itself was shrinking, the result of severe cuts to university library budgets — historically a significant consumer of academic books.
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And then there was Reagan. With his election to the White House in 1980, Ronald Reagan — who as governor of California had led the charge against his own state university system — ushered in an ideology of tax cuts, reductions to government programs and private-sector gimmes that proved absolutely toxic to public universities. Some of the programmatic cuts came at the federal level: the research budgets of NOAA, NIST and the Department of Energy were slashed during his administration, for example, But these were hardly the main sources of government spending on higher education. The worse damage resulted from Reagan’s “federalist” devolution of spending burdens onto the states, the universities’ primary source of support. Program cuts and tuition increases became the norm — and continue to be so to this day.
The erosion of public support was particularly devastating to the humanities and scholarly publishing, areas that did not benefit from Reagan’s increased defense spending and trickle-down tax cuts for the wealthy. Arriving at a large state university in the early 1980s, as I did, was like showing up at a house party after the last guests had staggered home. The streets were littered with burnt-out hippies and faded dreams.
And yet, for all this change — seven decades of sweeping, perhaps even revolutionary transformation in American higher education — university publishing in 1984 was almost indistinguishable from what it had been in 1920. Research methodologies had changed; cover art had become a bit more modish; but technical monographs were still very much the rule. Times had changed; but time had not changed the university press. Instead, presses’ once-admirable dedication to scholarship now appeared, against this shifting economic and cultural background, as an almost fatal resistance to evolutionary pressures.
By 1980, those pressures were finally becoming irresistible. Press revenues were sinking, while expenses were increasing. Many universities, alarmed by the collapse, were perhaps too quick to see the problem as something that could be solved on the open market.
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Ten years passed. The Berlin Wall came down, and the Soviet Union collapsed. Like the now-stilled Soviet factories, university presses had once benefited from a system of public subsidies that allowed them to produce their goods without regard for demand. Once the subsidies were eliminated, the rate of production quickly became unsustainable. It was shock therapy time, not just in Moscow and Magnitogorsk, but in the People’s Republics of Berkeley, Ann Arbor, and Madison. Reagan had triumphed at home, as he supposedly had abroad. But both may have been Pyrrhic victories, as we are only now discovering.
At first glance, the defunding of presses seemed like a legitimate market correction: After all, if consumer demand for university press books was insufficient to support their publication, why should the presses be allowed to continue producing them at the same rate? To the onlooker unfamiliar with the history and inner workings of academic publishing, a university press looked a great deal like a New York trade house in miniature. Therefore, logic dictated, they should be just as capable of surviving on the open market. If Alfred Knopf could make money selling his titles, why couldn’t university presses do the same? Campus administrators found it very hard to defend what appeared, in this light, to be underperforming revenue centers. Over time, they began urging their presses to attend more closely to the bottom line.
Unfortunately, this way of thinking incorporated two critical fallacies:
1. A book is not a book is not a book. University presses were established out of a recognition that academic monographs were never going to be profitable. They were too technical, their audiences too small to support mass-market publication. Instead, the closed cycle (scholar as author, university as publisher, library as consumer) was supposed to subsidize work that was of significant intellectual and scientific value to a small but influential cadre of experts. In other words, university presses were specifically designed to produce a public good, exempt from market forces. The decision to defund presses was made without sufficient attention to this history, or the effect that disregarding it would have on the scholarly production of knowledge.
2. Even if all other things were equal — which they weren’t — commercial publishing faced serious problems of its own. Sales of individual titles were declining, fueling intense competition for readers. New market-research techniques were defining ever-narrower audiences and creating a Balkan nightmare of microgenres, from historical romance to religious self-help. Corporate media conglomerates were buying up old-line brands like Random House, Doubleday, and Simon & Schuster with an eye toward discarding their unprofitable divisions and extracting core value. High-prestige, low-revenue genres like literary fiction and serious non-fiction were often seconded in this process, or discarded altogether.
In short, university administrators were pushing their presses into the deep end of an empty pool. Monographs, once the pride of the industry, were now derided as money-losers (to this day university press editors disqualify commercially unpromising manuscripts on the grounds that they’re “too monographic”). Provosts and vice presidents for finance, dismayed by steadily shrinking revenues, imposed further cutbacks, slowly strangling their already-weakened charges. Embattled press directors were busy just trying to keep their organizations afloat.
Reagan had won a crucial battle in the culture wars, without ever firing a shot — or even realizing that battle had been engaged. His unwitting campus allies had overlooked the relationship between the two basic contributions of university presses: their stewardship of peer review, which ensured the quality of new scholarly research; and their production of high-cost, low-sales technical monographs, which advanced the knowledge of small but influential fields of experts. These were public goods that no one could generate, absent a subsidy. But university leaders, instead of recognizing the inability of the market to properly value scholarly books, saddled their presses with a pair of contradictory missions: to produce the most advanced research for a small audience, while simultaneously earning their own way with at best a minimal subsidy. University administrators would be loath to admit as much, but somewhere the Gipper was probably smiling.
The market was, and still is, allowed to determine the relative publishability of many university press books. This has not worked out well, of course, and many host universities have quietly forgiven their presses’ debts over the years — a tacit acknowledgment, perhaps, of the underlying paradox. But even this partial exposure to market forces has quietly, radically transformed the way the presses do business.
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Press directors have, until recently, had relatively few options for resisting these pressures. Although they chafed at the suggestion that their presses should be self-sustaining, their arguments mostly fell on deaf ears. Many of them relented, embracing various plans to achieve financial independence. One of the most popular of these “solutions” was the generation of revenues from the publication of supposedly profitable genres (trade, regional, nature, cookbooks, fiction, or special-interest titles, such as the books about universities’ football and hockey teams that have done so well recently). These funds would then be used to subvene the publication of unprofitable monographs, thus reinstating some version of the closed cycle and allowing university presses to uphold their mission. But in a business where every new title, no matter how carefully crafted and market-tested, is an almost pure embodiment of risk, and where presses are still beholden to unrealistic financial expectations, university publishers have understandably continued to shun less-profitable scholarly texts.
The presses carry their share of the blame for this impasse. Few industry sectors in America are so antiquated in their practices, or so ill-informed about the market for their products, although this is now rapidly changing in the face of extreme pressure. Publishers are fond of reminding whoever will listen that books are not widgets: When you are rolling out 50 or 100 or 500 new titles a year, each appealing to a unique community of readers, it’s simply not possible, they claim, to conduct market research the way that Ford does for cars or Microsoft for software. Books are one of our most idiosyncratic goods: walk into a bookstore sometime, and try to figure out what makes you pick up one volume over another. Or log onto your favorite online bookseller’s site, and try to understand what makes you choose one of the almost 200,000 titles published every year. You will quickly appreciate that publishing books is like using the world’s largest shotgun to bag the world’s smallest songbird.
The presses are further hampered by chronic undercapitalization, and at least privately many directors blame their host institutions for their woes. I am fortunate, in that the University of Michigan (at whose press I was until recently employed) has been foresightful enough to invest in certain of its press’s key initiatives. But this is the exception that proves the rule. By subjecting presses to the whims of the market, while simultaneously insisting that they continue to publish their inherently unprofitable scholarly books, most American universities have forced their publishers into an untenable position. It is equally true that the directors of many of those presses have so far failed to creatively resist these expectations.
If the real value of university presses is their role as the stewards of peer review — the rigorous scrutiny of research by qualified experts, and the publication of high-level scholarship for a specialized readership — then profits, no matter what the preferred strategy to achieve them, should never be a presumptive goal. University presses are valuable when they make the very best research available to scholars and the world at large. Anything else they try to do will just leave them a pale imitation of the trade houses. HarperCollins will always outdo Cambridge in volume; Princeton can never match Random House in sales dollars; Norton’s social impact will inevitably transcend Chicago’s. Perhaps the simple answer is that we publish too much. But the stream of new books can’t stop as long as society and the tenure system demand new ideas and expertise. Reaganomics delivered a crippling blow to the socialist ideal of scholarly publishing, but the demand for human knowledge forces us to limp on.
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Deus ex digita: The advent of digital technologies has made possible both process economies and more sophisticated and flexible publications, incorporating everything from blogs and wikis to streaming audio and video to user-driven GIS applications. But despite the enormous value that these new technologies offer to scholarly researchers, university presses have been exceptionally slow to adopt them. Although most presses now have reasonably functional, if not always terribly sophisticated, Web sites, very few offer their readers digital publications with capabilities much beyond the basic scrolling, search and print functions — and this despite the fact that their host institutions are the acknowledged fonts of technological innovation. The recent Ithaka report laments this state of affairs, noting the rather haphazard nature of universities’ investments in their presses, and pressing for more aggressive — and strategic investment in digital publication.
Why are we having this conversation now, so many years after the commercial media began moving into new-media ventures? Put simply, the presses’ struggle to survive on an open market to which their products were ill-adapted left them cash- and resource-poor. With the exception of a few of the wealthiest operations (e.g., Oxford), university presses have no venture capital, no institutionalized means for investing in next-generation media. This lack of resources is compounded by the current insufficiency of demand for digital publications. The presses have found themselves temporarily stranded: clinging with one hand to a raft of print books whose market value is steadily sinking, while grasping with the other hand for new technologies that bob, tantalizingly, just out of reach.
A number of savvy administrators and press directors have decided to reach for the digital lifeboat, despite the considerable risks involved. MIT Press is perhaps the best-known, but many others, including Michigan, are propounding coherent visions of the digital future. Sadly, even at the prototype stage some of these efforts have been hampered by the host institutions’ continued insistence on the presses’ self-sustenance. After all, a digital book is no more likely to make money than its print analog. Indeed, because of high opportunity costs and the difficulty of establishing the intellectual and professional legitimacy of digital publications, most early-stage efforts will be lucky to break even. The result is an odd paradox: despite the fact that everyone agrees in principle on the promise of digital media, university presses are not on the whole being equipped to move decisively into the digital domain. This was perhaps the main finding of the Ithaka report, and one of the reasons why press directors and university administrators have damned the report with faint praise, by lauding its clear assessment of the problem while, by implication, lamenting its failure to propose a practical solution.
If nothing is done, and soon, unrealistic financial requirements will distort our efforts to distribute scholarly information in digital media, much as they have long hampered our work in the ink-and-paper era. With intelligence and foresight, new technologies could enable university publishers to more effectively fulfill their core mission of vetting and publishing the best research. This effective use of new technologies requires an understanding that presses are not revenue centers, but an irreplaceable service to science and society. Conscientious university administrators are already recognizing this public good as being well worth the price. Hopefully their peers will follow suit. It’s time, in 2007, to lay Reagan’s ghost to rest.
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I respond to the author’s statement that “the closed cycle (scholar as author, university as publisher, library as consumer) was supposed to subsidize work that was of significant intellectual and scientific value to a small but influential cadre of experts. In other words, university presses were specifically designed to produce a public good, exempt from market forces.”
Experts tend to be better paid than non-experts and are well positioned to know what new publications are of most value to them. Pricing scholarly works at true cost enables their expert audiences to choose rationally which new publications are of most value for the money. If the experts won’t choose to pay for a book targeted to them, then the general public most certainly should not be paying unless the work commands genuine mass market support.
Marvin McConoughey, at 8:25 am EDT on September 14, 2007
James,
Although your lead sentence has the veneer of substance, I appreciate your passionate candor on this matter and your call for institutional initiatives. Projecting blame on Reagan or any President is unfortunate given the merit of much of the rest of your argument, and actually runs contrary to what you share. You note the flooding of dollars as both causal (after WWII) and now necessary for survival. While working for the late Robert Van Kampen, progenitor of the Van Kampen trademark, he told me that his frustration with educators is the predictable quagmire on business-related decisions. He told me “I can make ten decisions before you educators can make one, and then you don’t know if it’s correct.” Your notion of the presses static through the 1980s, and clutching to past practices, seems to be the fulcrum of the problem facing the sustaining of peer-reviewed material, not a political ideology. Upon reading this piece I was reminded of your earlier comments to Scott’s July 31 article, “New Model for University Presses” (http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/07/31/ricepress). You write, “Which brings us back to the point: university presses will become more innovative when one of two things happen: either 1) presses wean themselves from their historic reliance on their host institutions; or 2) universities become more imaginative in administering their presses. The latter option, perhaps slightly more likely than the former, requires that administrators free up venture capital. . . “ In a sense, you’re now faulting trustees—most of whom are rather successful business men and women, for trying to explore the first option. Also, this is the same thing that nearly every major funder (e.g., The Lilly Endowment and the Lumina Foundation for Education) ask of recipients – to have a sustainability plan. These are great folks passionate about the educational enterprise. Your current article suggests that this sustainability notion is unfair—and that the very inherent value of publishing is reason enough for its place in the general budget. Also, having worked with many venture capitalists—including in the publishing field—“freeing up venture capital” seems to defy sensible financing options. As you note—the risks are great, major collaborations are forming elsewhere, and colleges’ primary “business” is not the publishing business (a glaring concern here). While I agree with much of what you write, I find a logical disconnect between your desires and reality, i.e., institutions doling out funds. There also seems to be a disregard for Andersen’s Long Tail and “long-tail presses” when you note the unlikely profitability of digital publications (on-demand is part of this Jukebox phenomenon; Amazon sure has figured this out to the tune of billions). Budgets aren’t returning to the “utopia” era, regardless of any political transitions. I’m headed to speak at NACADA where many educators from Florida’s leading institutions had to withdraw due to budget cuts statewide. I spoke to the Texas A & M faculty (Commerce) on the topic of grant-funded research because of this same crisis between peer-review requirements and funds to get there from zero. I am painfully aware of pains of publishing, with three books at academic presses and two at McGraw-Hill—also highly invested in the review process. In the light of Mortensen and others clamoring for the inherent goodness and “rightness” of switching funds to under-represented students (which has a lot of merit), where will universities without large endowments get such revenue? More presses will likely follow the excellent lead of Rice, and others the collaborative spirit of Stanford/Rice. As we saw recently with the New York Times efforts, there is money to be made, and like you suggest, it takes considerable creativity—the very thing that your articulated Reagan was trying to force upon our academy. You note that “presses” provide an “irreplaceable service to society.” If you substitute “presses” with “the dissemination of peer-reviewed material,” I’d agree. When I spoke on your campus last year at the P-16 workshop several graduate students present remained excited about their research. There was little alarm that tenure would escape them someday because of a lack of publishing outlets, and like the session itself, the web provided a forum (though Bugeja’s advice needs heeded, “The Publishing Pipeline”). I think the U.S. still has an intellectual utopia when looking globally—in fact, your very article in the brilliant online InsideHigherEd venue reflects such a state. I sincerely have appreciated your insights in the past and currently, and am hopeful for the continuation of a sustained peer-review process.JP
Jerry Pattengale, AVP for Scholarship and grants at Indiana Wesleyan University, at 10:43 am EDT on September 14, 2007
I agree with the Unapologetically Tenured’s comment that Reagan wasn’t the real villian in the serious reduction in the funding of the University of California. I was a graduate student at UC Santa Barbara during the early ’70s and, as grad student rep to the academic senate, served on several university committees. I will never forget the words of then Chancellor Vern Cheadle who said to a group of us, all faculty and administrators (except me), upon returning exhausted from a Regent’s meeting with new Governor Junior Brown, “I never thought I would say this, but where is Ronald Reagan now that we need him! At least we could talk to Reagan, he’d listen to a reasonable argument. Governor Brown won’t even listen to us.”
People who were at UC in both the ’60s and the ’70s know that while Reagan was concerned about radicalism at UC, he was still basically a friend of the University, whereas Jerry Brown was never a friend of the University.
It’s ironic, because Jerry’s father Pat Brown, was probably the best friend the University of California ever had. But, while Pat went to public schools and UC (my father knew him both growing up in San Francisco and at Berkeley), Jerry went to private schools.
Rob Perelli-Minetti, at 10:00 am EDT on September 14, 2007
There is no such thing as “benign socialism.” Presidents notwithstanding, publishing, academic and otherwise, is subject to the same market forces that every other enterprise endures. Everything has its costs, whether they be reckoned in dollars or oppportunities. It seems to me, as an author published both by university presses and a trade house, that the key is to figure out where the balance should be, not simply pine for mythical palmy days of limitless resources in higher education.
Victor Stater, Professor of History at Louisiana State University, at 10:35 am EDT on September 14, 2007
The “ghost” that is killing U-presses isn’t Reagan.
It’s Stalin.
I have had direct experiences (including especially with U of Michigan Press!) where a book that had significant commercial promise was turned down because it didn’t fit the ideological predispositions of the board.
So, if Mr. Reische’s idea of “market forces” is the problem of nonsales of politically correct crap, and nonpublication of commercially (and intellectually) useful books....Well, any U-press that thinks the world owes it a living while it publishes propaganda deserves to be squeezed to death.
The point is that Reaganism didn’t kill the U-presses. Instead, it was rather their Stalinist desire to control the world of ideas, and publish only things that advanced their leftist agenda.
Michael Munger, Chair, Poli Sci at Duke University, at 10:35 am EDT on September 14, 2007
Mr. Reische:
In the interest of transparency, are you affiliated with PRISM (http://www.prismcoalition.org/)? Was your piece requested by, written with, vetted by or sponsored in any way by PRISM or a PRISM affiliate?
Gary Holden
Gary Holden, at 10:35 am EDT on September 14, 2007
Mr. Reische states several times that University Presses are “stewards of peer review.” In this day and age, why should peer review be tied to the production of written works in physical form? The peer review process itself is what’s of value to the academic community. Subsidizing peer review as a public good would be far cheaper than subsidizing the full book production process. University Presses would become University Peer Review Boards, who would dispense their stamp of approval to manuscripts submitted by scholars. Once their book or monograph were approved, it would go up on the internet in digital form. Anyone could access it for free. Those willing to read off the screen could download it and anyone who wanted a dead tree copy could just send the file to one of the many print on demand publishing houses and have a copy in a week or so. This would benefit content authors because more manuscripts could be peer reviewed without the additional expense of printing. It would benefit readers by making a much greater variety of scholarly material available for free.
Chris, at 11:25 am EDT on September 14, 2007
My message above is ambiguous, or at least requires close reading.
So, let me clear: James Reische was editor at the UMich Press at the time of my “experience.”
However, his behavior was exemplary. He played it entirely straight, and fought for the book. It was turned down for what I see as purely ideological reasons at a higher level.
So, my criticism is of his argument, not of his behavior. As far as I know, Mr. Reische has NEVER imposed his own views (whatever they are; I don’t even know!) on any author or decision process.
This cannot be said of the boards, or outside reviewers selected strategically by those boards.
Michael Munger, Chair, Poli Sci at Duke University, at 11:25 am EDT on September 14, 2007
What a tremendously silly article. The writer has completely ignored the role of technology in the evolution of scholarly writing. Thanks to the internet, expenive specialized scholarly monograms no longer need to be physically printed and sent to libraries across the country. This is not a bad thing. It is a good thing. The world has moved on. The author should remember that cars don’t need buggy whips and University Presses don’t need to publish scholarly monograms.
Sid Knowles, at 11:45 am EDT on September 14, 2007
Speaking as the current president of the Association of American University Presses, I first want to applaud James Reische for his well-informed survey of the recent history of university press publishing. While we may not all agree with his analysis of exactly what the problems are or his prescriptions for resolving them, he certainly has painted a picture that touches on many of the major developments affecting scholarly publishing (and not just that done by university presses) in the past half-century. I would hope that many faculty read this piece and inform themselves better about what has been happening with the business on which their own livelihoods (to the extent that many either have to “publish or perish") depend. Having frequently participated in panels on publishing at scholarly conventions, most recently (in the past two weeks) at the conferences of political scientists and Latin Americanists, I am always disappointed that so few people attending these sessions are senior scholars and that so much of the discussion is oriented to telling graduate students or very junior faculty about how to go about getting their revised dissertations published. The larger issues affecting the system are hardly ever addressed or discussed in any detail. But faculty need to know what is going on because, ultimately, it is their pressure on administrations that will lead to the best solutions to the problems we all face together.
Mr. Reische certainly is right to identify undercapitalization and unrealistic expectations of commercial performance as two major problems that have prevented presses from moving more quickly toward sound long-term solutions. And he rightly points to the difficulties that face efforts at internal cross-subsidization because presses risk losing lots of money by trying to compete effectively in the trade marketplace. Only the largest presses have any reasonable chance of competing for books by the top nonfiction writers, and given the increasing scarcity of review space in major media for serious books and the business practices of chain superstores that result often in more returns than sales, even the largest presses are challenged to succeed in this arena. The lack of venture capital he notes is important because presses do not have the resources to innovate in the way that giant commercial publishers like Elsevier do, yet administrators chafe at the prices their libraries have to pay such publishers for books and especially journals in science, technology, and medicine. If they had invested properly in their presses in the immediate post-WWII period when commercial publishers like Pergamon led by the enterprising Robert Maxwell entered this sector, they might not now be saddled with the problems from the outsourcing of academic publishing in the STM arena they are now deploring.
But there are other dimensions of the problem that Mr. Reische does not address, which are equally important. One of these on which I have frequently written is the dysfunctionality that results from lack of coordination within universities. A good example is the plight of the revised dissertation at present. Librarians “rationally” do not want to buy books based on dissertations because many of them already subscribe to the ProQuest database of dissertations, so this type of book does not sell as well as other monographic works; press editors, aware of this pattern of sales, are reluctant to publish many revised dissertations and thus “rationally” do not invite submissions of as many as they once did; yet promotion-and-tenure committees “rationally” continue to insist on one book for tenure and often a second in progress, which junior faculty are hard pressed to accomplish without having the first book based on their dissertation. Each sector is making its own decision “rationally,” yet together they constitute an irrational system as a whole. This is only one of many such examples that exist in universities, with corresponding effects on how presses operate and manage to survive.
One way in which some universities are attempting to meet these challenges and achieve economies is to bring their presses, libraries, and computer centers into more cooperative relationships. Penn State, I am proud to say, has been a leader in this effort, and two years ago the press officially became an administrative unit of the library (which works closely with the computer division) and the two jointly created an Office of Digital Scholarly Publishing. The library, wishing to engage in more publishing of its own, benefits from the press’s expertise in editing, design, marketing, and order-fulfillment; the press gains from having access to more IT support,the library’s close relationship with the faculty, and its staff’s capabilities in metadata creation, archiving, and preservation. The synergies result in greater efficiencies and lower costs than either could achieve separately. Similar relationships have been developing elsewhere, at California and Michigan perhaps most notably. Such cooperative ventures are applauded in the Ithaka report as one way to advance beyond our current difficulties. They also involve various experiments in “open access” publishing, which put to the test the ambitions to operate presses in the interest of the public good and to a degree free them from overdependence on the market economy.
As for Reagan’s role in all this, I will only note that it was during Reagan’s administration that the NEH’s program of publication subventions on which many presses like ours had relied to help publish many worthy projects that could not succeed on sales alone was abolished. Subsidies for monographs in the humanities remain scarce, and this was a major loss for publishing in this arena.
Professor Munger’s complaint about the “political correctness” of presses, I would suggest, reflects his own personal experience rather than any systematic bias across the industry. As an editor at both Princeton and Penn State, I have myself published books spanning the political spectrum from conservative and libertarian to social democratic and Marxist. As long as the arguments are cogent and the scholarship sound, I think most editors (being Millians at heart who believe that truth best emerges from the competition of ideas in unfettered discourse) are happy to publish books representing many different points of view.
Sandy Thatcher, Director at Penn State Press, at 12:20 pm EDT on September 14, 2007
“Chris” and “Sid Knowles” need to educate themselves better. The costs of publishing books electronically are not significantly different from publishing them in print; the costs are incurred in different ways, but they do not disappear. At our Office of Digital Scholarly Publishing we are doing exactly what Chris recommends, publishing monographs in a Romance Studies series “open access,” while offering readers the option of having copies printed off “on demand.” This is an adaptation of an experiment begun ten years ago by the National Academies Press in the sciences. It worked for that press, and we hope it works for our press, too. Few readers want to read a 300-page monograph on a computer screen, so the POD option is important. That involves printing and distribution costs just as traditional publishing does, though of course it does save on inventory costs and creates better cash flow.
I appreciate the clarification from Professor Munger. But I would add that my experience at both Princeton and Penn State has shown no such bias affecting decisions about what gets published at the editorial board level—except one instance at Princeton when a book by a feminist scholar with rave reviews, which has since become a classic in the field, was rejected because the reviews were too enthusiastic and raised suspicions on the board about bias on the part of the readers! If this was political correctness, it worked in the reverse fashion.
Sandy Thatcher, Director at Penn State Press, at 12:30 pm EDT on September 14, 2007
Sandy, POD does involve printing and distribution costs, but why should the university be involved? The printing and binding of books is not a place where an academic institution adds any sort of unique value. If a reader wants a physical copy, they can send the electronic manuscript to a commercial print on demand operation. Let the university concentrate on the truly scholarly aspects of the process, like peer review.
Chris, at 1:15 pm EDT on September 14, 2007
Chris, the university does not do any printing or binding. All of this is outsourced, and that is true for every other university press in the U.S. (Princeton once had its own printing plant, but sold it off back in the 1980s; and that press wasn’t owned by the university anyway.) But the revenue stream from POD sales, which would not exist if individuals went to find their own POD outlets themselves, is important to presses in paying for all the pre-printing costs of publishing, which still account for 60% to 70% of the overall costs of publishing a book. Books still need to be, besides peer reviewed, copyedited and designed even if they are purely electronic, and if anyone is to know about them , they need to be marketed, reviewed in various media, displayed at conferences, etc. If all sales are eliminated and everything is distributed for free, then universities would be faced with increasing the subsidies of their presses from the 10% level where most subsidize them now (if they do at all) to 100%—and that is not about to happen anytime soon!
Sandy Thatcher, Director at Penn State Press, at 1:55 pm EDT on September 14, 2007
As I started to write this, I see Sandy Thatcher has beat me to it. The value of university presses is in processes that have nothing to do with technology. If we can find ways to fund those processes (which are about peer review, badly misprepresented by the PRISM debacle) the mission of university presses (and universities) can continue, however those books are designed and distributed. But to suggest that technology has rendered UPs obsolete ignores what publishing is about. It could also be used to argue that universities are no longer needed, now you can podcast lectures on the Internet.
As far as the argument that we don’t need university presses because expertise that doesn’t have a mass audience or can’t otherwise carry its own weight (though sales to other experts) has no social value — well, sometimes we don’t know what’s valuable until it’s too late. That’s why university press books filled the gap in bestseller lists after 9/11. Trade publisers wouldn’t have bothered with those titles because who’s interested in middle east politics or Islam? And don’t we need well-researched, well-argued books about topics most Americans don’t want to think about?
By the way, trade publishers are no more tech savvy than UPs, though they are very much interested in cost-cutting and profit margins. I just reviewed copyedits for a book coming out from a New York commercial publisher — on paper, with instructions to use a different color pencil than the copy editor.
Incidentally, one reason trade publishers have not yet figured out the e-book market is that they’re so concerned about how to put locks on their intellectual property. If we could fund the work of university presses so that they could put out quality products and release them on the Web, research could find its audience and have more social impact than it can if we’re trying to fund it after the fact, through sales.
barbara fister, at 1:55 pm EDT on September 14, 2007
One factor Reische overlooks in his description of the glory days of university press publishing is the network of quality academic campus bookstores that supported it. The typical university bookstore was once seen by its institution as part of the mission- making money would be nice, but the primary purpose of the store was to make scholarship available to the campus community. Like the rapidly disappearing mission-based art museum shop, the bookstores have been transformed into profit centers. Why carry a book of limited academic interest when a sweatshirt will out-sell it, and at a better margin? With a few notable exceptions like the superb Seminary Coop Bookstore at the University of Chicago, the demise of shops that will deeply stock academic backlist has been a tragedy.
John Eklund, at 2:00 pm EDT on September 14, 2007
What percentage of a university press’s sales currently go to university libraries? Given the potential savings to libraries of not having to buy, catalog, store, and lend out copies of all these seldom read scholarly publications, I think that subsidizing 100% of a book’s pre-publication costs ought to be quite possible. Working out the details of how to get money from university library budgets to university presses would be difficult (particularly since not every university with a library has a university press). However, moving to a free, open access publishing model would both save money and provide better access to scholarly publications.
Chris, at 4:05 pm EDT on September 14, 2007
The university library market for scholarly monographs was killed by two developments in the last twenty years: the proliferation of, and price increases in, scientific,technical, and medical journals (STM), and the ability to easily track the use of library materials through computers.
The huge cost increases for STM journals squeezed the budgets for monographs, and thanks to the increasing emphasis on funded scientific research in the university, created an irresistible political imperative to fund journals at the expense of monographs.
The use of computers to track materials usage revealed that the scholarly monograph sat on the shelf, ignored by faculty and students alike. As I browsed the new UP titles coming through, I often wondered, “Who would possibly be interested in this topic?” The answer appeared to be “No one, except possibly the author.” Hence, the easiest thing was to cease buying esoteric UP output and divert the funds to amassing additional journal subscriptions or avoiding the cancellation of titles by paying the exorbitant price increases. The faculty didn’t miss the monographs, but the complaints over canceled journal titles were loud and persistent.
The next iteration of scholarly monograph publishing can’t be paid from library budgets. They’re already funding electronic jiurnals.
Ron Force, Dean of Library Services Emeritus at U of Idaho, at 9:05 pm EDT on September 14, 2007
As the author of this piece, it has been enormously gratifying to follow the thoughtful responses so many people have provided. This was my first formal publication on the subject (after a lot of conference presentations, blog posts, etc., over the years), and I’ll admit to feeling some trepidation about its reception. I can safely say that my fears were misplaced. While I don’t agree with all of my critics—or even some of my supporters, as I’ll explain in a moment—the discussions that are swirling around this question about the future of scholarly publishing seem to me to be of a requisitely high level to actually drive constructive change. That is, the impulse is there, and the question is really one of whether any real degree of consensus will crystallize around a particular approach or set of approaches, or whether we’ll fall back into the same kind of fatalism that characterizes so much of the field at present. It’s an attitude that I once labeled “disappointed idealism” in an essay on Dostoevsky and Celine, and which I see everywhere in scholarly publishing: a tenacious idealism submerged under a hardened, even bitter pragmatism about the real possibilities for change.
Well, I’m going to make an ass of myself and persist in an optimistic direction. But I’d like to begin by answering some of the major points readers have raised in response to my piece. This is a long post, and I apologize, but there were a lot of ideas worth responding to, and I’ve tried to be thorough. Please, skip around if you want.
First, and most importantly, I never meant to imply that Ronald Reagan actually cared a whit about scholarly publishing. I was therefore surprised to see the comments from Unapologetically Tenured and Jerry Pattengale in particular, which seemed to me to misconstrue my argument. On returning to the piece after reading their critiques, I now see where I should have been more emphatic. To clarify: I seriously doubt that Ronald Reagan ever so much as uttered the phrase “scholarly publishing” during the course of his lifetime. My goal was not to claim he did, but to highlight the indirect ways in which his Presidency marked a crucial moment in the history of university presses:
1)As I remark in the section beginning “And then there was Reagan...,” the first of these was the triumph of Reaganomics and so-called federalism, which in my opinion was really just the federal government’s divestiture of responsibility for the traditional obligations of the state—obligations that were supposedly going to be fulfilled by the free market, but which in the event had to be picked up by the states. This is the one sense in which I think George W. Bush can be accurately described as completing the Reagan revolution: by untying the last lines of regulation and oversight that tethered private industry to the public good. Returning to Reagan and the UPs, though, this divestiture placed enormous burdens on states, which, understandably, were forced to make cuts in various areas of their budgets. Public education—including higher education—fell victim to some of the harshest cuts. And university administrations, in turn, had to make some hard choices of their own. In other words, a series of individual actions had an unanticipated aggregate effect: one (the disenfranchisement of university presses), which Reagan was almost certainly unaware of, but which I seriously doubt he would have objected to.2)The second avenue of influence is purely intellectual (a phrase not often heard in its un-negated form, in reference to RWR). What perhaps most intrigues me at a level of pure social abstraction is the question of how a group of people (in this case, university administrators) who are generally opposed to an ideology (Reaganism, which I very much do think is an ideology) can nonetheless unconsciously absorb some elements of that ideology into their thinking and even become proponents of it. Metaphorically, this is an intellectual version of viral transmission: some piece of Reaganism’s RNA was inserted into the genetic code of academia, which then began replicating it blindly, even to the extent of threatening its own systemic survival. As I point out, I think many academics and higher-ed administrators would be horrified to think of themselves as having become Reaganites as any way. My piece was meant to make readers aware of the fact that they seem to have nonetheless done so—and hopefully to enable us to consciously move in a more constructive direction.
As for “Tenured’s” objections to Reagan’s rising stock, well, we’re about 20 years on, which seems to be roughly the cycle for waves of historical revision—and appropriately so, given that enough time has gone by to allow us to appreciate the long-term effects. It would be difficult, in my mind (not to say inaccurate) to write a history of the last thirty years in American politics that doesn’t assign significant influence to Reagan and his cohort. Without his administration you don’t have George H.W. Bush, or Dick Cheney, or Donald Rumsfeld, or George W. Bush for that matter (who’s no Ronald Reagan, but who never would have been elected without the help from his father and GHWB’s buddies from the Reagan White House).
Marvin McConoughey has a fair point, and one which is commonly made: let the market set the price. Except that it’s subject to several incorrect assumptions. First, that “experts tend to be better paid than non-experts.” Apparently McConoughey has forgotten about the hundreds of thousands of graduate students around the country, who need to know the literature more urgently than anyone, and yet who, often with families, are living on next to nothing. Even as a grad student at Harvard and Michigan in the 1990s, most of my books were freebies given to me by professors who had extra copies taking up space on their shelves. This is hardly a way to run a system of higher education.
It also neglects the libraries, which of course are at the core of the story. Commercial academic presses like Routledge and Elsevier are notorious for charging what they claim are fair-market prices, which frequently turn out to run north of $100 a book. Sure, you could argue that universities should boost library budgets instead of subsidizing presses, but it’s a big circle, and the point isn’t to set these institutions against each other but, as Sandy Thatcher points out, to help them cultivate healthy partnerships that benefit the scholarly community as a whole.
Jerry Pattengale’s quote from Van Kampen is nicely on the money. Presses went through a considerable period of general stagnation in the 1980s (or at least Michigan did; there were notable exceptions, as always), and much of it had to do with a failure to read the historical trends and foresee their likely effects. This is the core of my argument. But at the same time I think the quote misses a fundamental distinction. If your goal is to create a market to which you can sell a defined product—whether it’s securities or windshield wipers—then you need an organization capable of making accurate strategic choices and acting on them decisively. But if, as I would argue (and this is a principle that I absorbed from my boss at the University of Michigan Press, Phil Pochoda), your goal is to create a virtually endless series of unique products, each of which appeals to an entirely different audience, and the market-readiness of each (that is to say, in this case its scholarly merit) has to be vetted with enormous care, then you need to run your organization very differently. Quick and decisive management is not enough for a university press. Scholarly publishing by definition will always be at least as much of a craft as a trade. If it ever ceases to be so, then it will also have ceased to deserve the label “scholarly.” And I would argue that the current crisis is really a failure to creatively reconcile the tensions between craft and market. My conclusion is that we should have a little less market and a little more craft.
It’s hard to know what to say to Victor Stater’s statement that “There is no such thing as ‘benign socialism.’” Clearly he missed the irony of that juxtaposition: if I thought my readers would understand all socialism as benign, I wouldn’t have needed the descriptor. But if you’ll look at the last sentence of the previous paragraph in this response, you’ll see that he and I agree, to an extent. Where I think we differ is that he thinks all publishing is rightfully subject “to the same market forces that every other enterprise endures,” whereas I think that to treat scholarly publishing like a financial enterprise is a dreadful mistake, which comes at a great cost to the integrity of the system of scholarly communications and the accumulation of knowledge.
I was profoundly hurt by Mike Munger’s response until I saw his followup, and even still a bit afterwards. Mike’s a good guy and an incredibly talented political scientist, arguably one of the most respected of his generation. He has given me good advice about manuscripts over the years, and has been an extremely reliable and acute peer reviewer. He’s also a UMP author. I happen to think he’s sorely mistaken about the reasons why the manuscript he mentions was rejected, but I also don’t think this is the place for that argument. Suffice to say that the University of Michigan Press’s list includes both Trotsky’s Literature and Revolution and a new book co-authored by Condoleezza Rice and two fellows of the Hoover Institution, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Kiron Skinner; a biography of Paul Wellstone by the communications director of Wellstone Action, and economics books by various members of the staunchly libertarian Independent Institute. I think you’d be hard-pressed to find a band of the political spectrum that we haven’t covered. And as Sandy points out, that’s true of any major university press in the country.
In response to Gary Holden’s question, I can only say “Huh”? Followed by: “no.” I happen to be concerned about Prism’s activities, which I see as a shill for commercial interests. But I’d still appreciate it if we could skip the “are you now or have you ever been...” business.
Chris and Sid Knowles make a number of incorrect assertions about scholarly publishing. Sandy Thatcher has addressed most of these in his comments, so I won’t belabor the point... much. Sid needs to learn the difference between a monogram, which Webster’s defines as “a sign of identity usually formed of the combined initials of a name”; and a monograph, which I would define as “the initial sign of identity in establishing a scholar’s name.” Or something. I never was much good with puns. More seriously, Sid’s crack about buggy whips is so thoroughly uninformed about the value of scholarship that I’d just as soon let it die a quiet death.
Chris does have an interesting point, which I raised at UMP a number of years ago: if people aren’t buying monographs, then shouldn’t presses focus on their core mission of providing stringent peer review? I wouldn’t be surprised if we see some movement in this direction, as one among a variety of new approaches (Rice University Press, Penn State, Michigan, and many others). But I can’t help but thinking that someone still needs to make sure the knowledge universities generate is available to others: to other experts, to policymakers, professionals and members of the general public. Thank you, Barbara Fister, for taking the trouble to reminder everyone that “sometimes we don’t know what’s valuable until it’s too late.” I would point to the work of Scott McLemee right here at IHE: Scott is an exceptional example of how a talented thinker and writer can sift through sometimes obscure and long-forgotten texts and use them to tell us something new and remarkably interesting about the world.
Sandy Thatcher is someone whose work I admire a great deal, and I was pleased to see his lengthy response to my piece and the ensuing comments. As evidence of Sandy’s copious talents as an editor and publisher, I would point out how he almost imperceptibly schools me on a number of points even as he overtly praises me. He’s correct that I chose no to address questions of coordination among units, an issue which he has emphasized in his work to bring Penn State’s press and library together. The rule of unintended consequences operates powerfully in scholarly publishing. That, of course, is part of my point, too: a series of individually rational (or, at least rationalizable) decisions over the course of many decades—made by politicians, universities, libraries, presses, departments, and individual scholars—has added up to a very troubling outcome, one whose impact on society’s collective welfare society is still, despite all our insiders’ discussions and all the worthy efforts of the AAUP and others, insufficiently appreciated. Here’s the driving impulse behind my piece, in a sentence: it is not possible to measure the value of knowledge is measured strictly in the dollars it attracts within a three-year period. That being publishers’ standard schedule for depreciating their inventory. If ideas are evaluated in these terms, then we’ll have to give up any hope of another Galileo, another Joyce, possibly even another Einstein. The pioneers of such promising new fields as artificial intelligence and nanotechnology were until recently treated more like science fiction authors than scientists. Nor under such a system, as Barbara Fister points out, would we have more than a bare handful of books to help us understand such momentous social phenomena as the eruption of Islamic fundamentalism, the re-emergence of socialism in Latin America, etc. Are you still listening, Victor Stater? Market value, indeed.
Barbara also raises a very good point about intellectual property. The AAP is, like the RIAA, desperately racing to lock up as much intellectual property as it can. Seen from their point of view this is entirely justifiable: they’re in the business of selling books, not disseminating knowledge. And there’s the crux of the biscuit. University presses were created by universities to help them disseminate their knowledge. The Bayh-Dole Act gave an enormous boost to universities’ tech transfer activities, the goal being to encourage universities to put their knowledge and innovation out in the public domain, where everyone can benefit from it. Presses have guarded this principle for more than 100 years.
John Eklund is absolutely correct that the demise of the truly good independent university bookstore is a loss to the system (has anyone been to the Harvard Coop lately? It’s a long walk through the sweatshirt section to the books, and they’re one of the better cases). I’m not sure what market share was sold through those channels, or whether those books are now being sold through the chains. I bet the AAUP has data on this. But I would suggest that the demise of the university bookstore is a consequence of some of the same factors that now threaten the university press: the explosion of the used book market, the glut of titles and the consequent shrinking of the market for any single book.
Ron Force is right: libraries were badly hurt by the criminal (in my opinion) inflation of subscription rates for STM journals. And university presses have to be very sensitive to those wounds, which is one reason why UPs shouldn’t start charging libraries a hundred dollars a pop for their monographs (the other reason, which I think I’ve made ad nauseum, is ethical).
The only way that universities can overcome the current dilemma plaguing scholarly communications is to help bring their libraries and presses together. So many of the respondents have said this, or left it assumed, that I need barely mention it here. It will be a slow process in which each of these institutions will have to work hard to learn about each others’ missions—their strengths and weaknesses, their aspirations and anxieties. But there is a solution. My goal in this article was to suggest that too many people, perhaps unconsciously echoing the Reagan ethos, are looking toward the market for salvation, when instead they should be surveying the rubble around them and taking an earnest inventory of the opportunities to build a new future.
Jim Reische, at 7:52 pm EDT on September 15, 2007
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Lose One for the Gipper
I share the author’s concern about the current state of the university press, but what’s with the Reagan bashing? Ronald Reagan is currently our most overrated former president, having replaced John F. Kennedy sometime in the late 1990s, and history will no doubt be unkind to his current legion of worshippers (if there were a stock market on future reputations, I’d sell my Reagan shares and buy Gorbachev). Still, whatever his faults, and he had many, I don’t think he had a lot to do with the decline of the U-press.
The tax revolt of the late 1970s occurred between the years of Governor Reagan and President Reagan, and Ronnie was only a bit player in its early stages. His record in California was a great deal more moderate than his rhetoric, and while he was given to McCarthyite ranting about radical students and professors, he kept the state’s universities reasonably well funded. His one attempt at hard-core tax reduction—a ballot initiative in 1973—went down in flames.
So if you want to blame someone for the current state of the university press, I’d recommend Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, whose lies and corruption fostered a cynicism about government that would eventually be cultivated and exploited by self-interested economic elites and naive libertarians. Reagan, as president, was much more the beneficiary of this movement than he was its leader. And the real damage was done at the state, rather than the federal, level.
Unapologetically Tenured, at 7:40 am EDT on September 14, 2007